The Czech economy had accelerated by 0.7% quarter-on-quarter at the end of last year, slightly above the original estimates, and had maintained its inflationary bias. Growth was mainly driven by household consumption, but fixed investment also added to the growth. Unit labour costs continued to rise due to again stronger wage and salary growth amid a lacklustre trend in productivity (see
here for more details), keeping potential inflationary pressures at bay, although there was also a slowdown in core services inflation in January and February. A possible upward break during March (but also April - a preliminary estimate will be available on 6 May, the day before the CNB meeting).
January data, on the other hand, showed a weakening in economic activity due to a slump in industry and construction, but core retail sales remain relatively resilient. This is despite a further rise in unemployment, which may partly reflect changes in legislation, and the labour market is likely to remain partly tight. In addition, wage growth, together with slowing inflation in January and February (averaging 1.5% y/y), is supporting a recovery in household purchasing power (see
the report on household disposable incomesfor more on this). More detailed numerical dynamics of the Czech economy in January on the
CBA Monitor - here, or the latest table below.
Added to this are the still resilient March purchase plans of consumers, but also industry. Although economic sentiment was already gathering during the period of higher oil prices, consumers (and not only them) were probably anticipating a more limited war with a short-term energy shock. This was probably matched by a limited rise in inflation expectations. Since this indicator will be key for the CNB, I constructed a composite index of price expectations relative to Czech inflation (see Chart 1 below) that could serve as a guide for the months ahead.
The newly constructed composite price expectations index for March suggests consumer inflation approaching around 3%. This is more or less in line with the current mechanical adjustments to the short-term outlook for consumer price growth due to higher fuel prices. These suggest a shift from February's CPI at 1.4% to 2% in March and 2.8% in April, with fuel adding around 1ppt to CPI growth while so far this year it has taken 0.3ppt out of it.
New credit growth remained strong in February, that is, for mortgages and home loans, while corporate loans weakened slightly compared to the second half of last year and were close to last year's average.
The weaker performance of Czech industrial and construction output at the start of this year, together with slightly weaker (albeit volatile) industrial wage growth, would likely have intensified the debate about the timing of a modest central bank interest rate cut hinted at by a section of the CNB's board
a month ago as the new year approached. However, the energy shock in the wake of the war with Iran significantly altered the central bank's rhetoric at its March meeting, which unsurprisingly resulted in leaving the CNB interest rate unchanged at 3.50%. For the central bank, the key will be how energy prices translate not only into fuel prices, but also how strong the impact will be on other energy prices, i.e. gas and electricity, and other commodities (with cross-sector impacts).
Even more important for the CBN will be the pass-through of these energy shocks into core inflation and the subsequent potential increase in the money supply (via bank lending or expansionary fiscal policy) due to less restrictive interest rates (so here we will compare the increase in inflation and wage expectations versus the yield curve). One of the key factors that will determine this pass-through is the anchoring of inflation expectations and labour market developments (employment and wage growth), or how expected economic activity, and hence expected real household incomes, will affect consumer acceptance of higher prices across the economy.
Although we can draw a parallel with the period of the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some of the circumstances are the same (it is an energy shock)
but in many ways they are different at present (the price scale of the shock particularly for gas and electricity, the extent of supply disruptions, the "sympathy" with higher prices among retailers affected by the covid vs. stronger real wage growth).